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Abstract—Conventionally, interference and noise are treated
as catastrophic elements in wireless communications. However,
it has been shown recently that exploiting known interference
constructively can even contribute to signal detection ability at
the receiving end. This paper exploits this concept to design
artificial noise (AN) beamformers constructive to the intended
receiver (IR) yet keeping AN disruptive to possible eavesdroppers
(Eves). The scenario considered here is a multiple-input single-
output (MISO) wiretap channel with multiple eavesdroppers.
Both perfect and imperfect channel information have been
considered. The main objective is to improve the receive signal-
to-interference and noise ratio (SINR) at IR through exploitation
of AN power in an attempt to minimize the total transmit power,
while confusing the Eves. Numerical simulations demonstrate
that the proposed constructive AN precoding approach yields
superior performance over conventional AN schemes in terms of
transmit power as well as symbol error rate (SER).
I. INTRODUCTION
Fifth-generation (5G) wireless communication systems aim
to achieve ultra-high spectral efficiency (SE) and orders-of-
magnitude improved energy efficiency (EE). It is also expected
that 5G networks will operate in multiple tiers deploying
ultra-dense small-cell base stations (BSs), e.g., heterogeneous
networks (HetNets). However, a major bottleneck in ultra-
dense HetNets is the cross-tier and co-tier interference. In
order to harvest the full potentials of 5G, developing sophis-
ticated interference handling tools is a crying need at the
moment. Traditional approach to dealing with the catastrophe
of interference is to suppress or even kill the interference
power in order to improve system performance [1], [2].
However, recent developments in interference exploitation
techniques have revolutionised this traditional way of dealing
with known interferences [3], [4]. Constrictive interference
(CI) precoding approaches suggest that interference power
can even contribute to the received signal power if properly
exploited [3]–[7]. This concept imports a major breakthrough
in designing wireless communication precoding when the
interference is known at the transmitter. In particular downlink
beamforming design can be significantly improved by symbol-
level precoding of known interferences [8], [9].
The broadcast nature of wireless channels makes the com-
munication naturally susceptible to various security threats.
However, the security of wireless data transmission has tra-
ditionally been entrusted to key-based cryptographic meth-
ods at the network layer. Recently, physical-layer security
(PLS) approaches have attracted a great deal of attention
in the information-theoretic society since the accompanying
techniques can afford an extra security layer on top of the
traditional cryptographic approaches [10]–[16]. PLS exploits
the channel-induced physical layer dynamics to provide in-
formation security. With appropriately designed coding and
transmit precoding schemes in addition to the exploitation of
any available channel state information (CSI), PLS schemes
enable secret communication over a wireless medium without
the aid of an encryption key.
The extent of eavesdropper’s CSI available at the transmitter
plays a vital role in determining the corresponding optimal
transmission scheme. If full CSI of all the links is available
at the transmitter, then the spatial degrees of freedom (DoF)
can be fully exploited to block interception [13]. However,
it is generally very unrealistic in practice. In particular, it
is almost impossible to obtain perfect eavesdroppers’ CSI
since eavesdroppers are often unknown malicious agents.
The situation can further worsen if multiple eavesdroppers
cooperate in an attempt to maximize their interception through
joint receive beamforming. Hence the authors in [13]–[15]
considered robust secrecy beamforming design based on deter-
ministic channel uncertainty models whereas [17] considered
probabilistic robust design.
To make physical-layer secrecy viable, we usually need
the legitimate user’s channel condition to be better than the
eavesdroppers’. However, this may not always be guaranteed
in practice. To alleviate the dependence on the channel con-
ditions, recent studies showed that the spatial DoF provided
by multi-antenna technology can be exploited to degrade
the reception of the eavesdroppers [12], [13]. A possible
way to do this is transmit beamforming, which concentrates
the transmit signal over the direction of the legitimate user
while reducing power leakage to the eavesdroppers at the
same time. Apart from this, a more operational approach is
to send artificially generated noise signals to interfere the
eavesdroppers deliberately [12]–[15]. Depending on the extent
of eavesdroppers CSI available at the transmitter, different
strategies can be applied to generate the optimal AN beams.
If no eavesdroppers’ CSI is available, then a popular design
is the isotropic AN [12], where the message is transmitted in
the direction of the intended receiver’s channel, and spatio-
temporal AN is uniformly spread on the orthogonal subspace
of the legitimate channel (see Fig. 1a). This scheme guarantees
that the intended receiver’s (IR’s) reception will be free from
the interference by the AN, while the ERs’ reception may
be degraded by the AN. On the other hand, with knowledge
of the eavesdroppers’ CSI to some extent, one can block
the eavesdroppers’ interception more efficiently by generating
spatially selective AN (see Fig. 1b) [13], [14]. More recently,
an antenna array based directional modulation scheme (DM)
has been studied which enhances security through adjusting
the amplitude and phase of the transmit signal along a specific
direction by varying the length of the reflector antennas for
each symbol while scrambling the symbols in other directions
[18]–[21].
In this paper, we exploit the knowledge of interference
available at the transmitter for improving security in wireless
systems. In this context, we redesign AN signals in the form
of constructive interference to the IR while keeping AN
disruptive to potential Eves. We consider a multiple-input
single-output (MISO) downlink system in the presence of
multiple Eves as shown in Fig. 1c. We aim at minimizing the
total transmit power while boosting the received SINR at the
IR as well as degrading the Eves’ SINR in an attempt to keep
the same below certain threshold. The benefits of constructive
interference-based AN precoding scheme is twofold compared
to conventional AN-based physical-layer security schemes
considered in [12]–[15]. Firstly, the constructive AN will boost
the receive SINR at the IR as opposed to the conventional AN-
based schemes which attempt to suppress AN signals along the
direction of the IR. Secondly, to achieve a predefined level
of SINR at the IR, constructive interference based precoding
scheme requires lower power compared to conventional AN
precoding, thus diminishing inter-user as well as inter-cell
interferences. Both perfect and imperfect CSI cases have
been investigated. Numerical simulations demonstrate that the
proposed constructive AN precoding approach yields superior
performance over conventional schemes in terms of transmit
power as well as symbol error rate (SER). For clarity, the
contributions are summarized below:
1) We first consider the case when CSI is perfectly known
and design two secure precoding schemes such that the
AN is constructive to the IR thus reducing the required
transit power for given performance and secrecy con-
straints.
2) We then move one step further to design a precoder such
that the AN is simultentously constructive to the IR and
destructive to Eves, further reducing the required transmit
power to guarantee security.
In all cases, the proposed schemes outperform the conventional
AN-aided secure precoding schemes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the system model of a secret MISO downlink system is
introduced. The conventional SINR-constrained power mini-
mization problem is discussed in Section III for the perfect
CSI case whereas in Section IV, a constructive AN-based
solution to the secrecy power minimization problem has been
devised. In order to further improve secrecy performance,
AN is designed as constructive for the IR and destructive
for Eves in Section V considering perfect CSI. On the other
hand, robust constructive-destructive AN precoding has been
designed in Section VI. Section VII presents the simulation
results that justify the significance of the proposed algorithms
under various scenarios. Concluding remarks are provided in
Section VIII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a MISO downlink system where the transmitter
(BS) equipped with NT transmit antennas intend to transmit
a secret message to the IR in the presence of K possible
eavesdroppers. The IR and the Eves are all equipped with
a single antenna. In order to confuse the Eves, the BS injects
AN signals into the secret message in an attempt to reduce the
receive SINRs at the Eves. Thus the received signal at the IR
and those at the Eves are given, respectively, by yd and ye,k:
yd = h
T
d x+ nd, (1)
ye,k = h
T
e,kx+ ne,k, for k = 1, . . . ,K, (2)
where hd and he,k are the complex channel vectors between
the BS and the IR and between the BS and the kth Eve, respec-
tively, nd ∼ CN (0, σ2d) and ne,k ∼ CN (0, σ2e ) are the additive
Gaussian noises at the IR and the kth Eve, respectively. The
BS chooses x as the sum of information beamforming vector
bdsd and the AN vector bn ,
∑N
i=1 bn,isn,i such that the
baseband transmit signal vector is
x = bdsd +
N∑
i=1
bn,isn,i, (3)
where sd ∼ CN (0, 1) is the confidential information-bearing
symbol for the IR and sn,i ∼ CN (0, 1), ∀i, are the AN
symbols in which N denotes the number of AN symbols.
Accordingly, the received SINR at the IR is given by
γd =
∣∣hTd bd∣∣2∑N
i=1
∣∣hTd bn,i∣∣2 + σ2d , (4)
and that at the kth Eve is given by
γe,k =
∣∣∣hTe,kbd∣∣∣2∑N
i=1
∣∣∣hTe,kbn,i∣∣∣2 + σ2e
, ∀k. (5)
The transmit signal x can also be expressed as
x = bdsd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)sd, (6)
where sd = dejφd . Assuming constant envelop d = 1, the
instantaneous transmit power is given by
PT =
∥∥∥∥∥bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
. (7)
(a) Conventional isotropic AN. (b) Conventional spatially selective AN.
(c) Constructive AN to boost received sig-
nal power.
Fig. 1: Exploiting AN to boost secrecy performance.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a power minimization problem for secure
transmission of information to the IR. Note that by minimizing
the power we actually decrease the SINR at Eves while main-
taining the QoS of signal reception at the desired destination.
Exploitation of the available knowledge of the AN will boost
the receive SINR at the IR. In order to satisfy the secrecy
requirements, conventional power minimization problem is
formulated as
P0 : min
bd,{bn,i}
‖bd‖2 +
N∑
i=1
‖bn,i‖2 (8a)
s.t.
∣∣hTdbd∣∣2∑N
i=1
∣∣hTdbn,i∣∣2 + σ2d ≥ Γd, (8b)∣∣∣hTe,kbd∣∣∣2∑N
i=1
∣∣∣hTe,kbn,i∣∣∣2 + σ2e
≤ Γe,k, ∀k. (8c)
The power minimization problem has been solved considering
various system configurations [14], [22]. One conventional
approach is to reformulate problem (8) as the following SDP
min
Wd,{Wn,i}
Tr(Wd) +
N∑
i=1
Tr(Wn,i) (9a)
s.t.
1
Γd
Tr(WdRd)−
N∑
i=1
Tr(RdWn,i) ≥ σ2d, (9b)
1
Γe,k
Tr(WdRe,k)−
N∑
i=1
Tr(Re,kWn,i)≤σ2e , ∀k,
(9c)
Wd  0, Wn,i  0, ∀i, rank(Wd) = 1, (9d)
where Wd , bdbHd and Wn,i , bn,ibHn,i, ∀i. Conventionally,
the non-convex rank constraint is dropped so that the relaxed
problem can be solved using existing solvers [23]. Interest-
ingly, it has been proved in [14], [22] that for a practically
representative class of scenarios, the original problem can be
solved optimally. Although the solutions proposed in [14], [22]
are optimal from stochastic viewpoint, the hidden power in
the AN signals has been treated as harmful for the desired
information, and hence, either nullified or suppressed. In the
following section, we endeavour to develop precoding schemes
exploiting the AN power constructively for the desired signal
at the IR.
IV. CONSTRUCTIVE AN-BASED SECURE PRECODING
In this section, we take the above approach one step forward,
by actively exploiting interference (AN in this case) construc-
tively for the IR to reduce the required power for a given
SNR threshold, while guaranteeing the secrecy constraint for
the Eves. We do this by optimizing the transmitted signal
part (x in (1)), which comprises of the desired symbol and
the AN symbols. The theory and characterization criteria for
constructive interference have been expensively studied in [3]–
[8]. To avoid repetition, we refer the reader to the above works
for the details, while here we employ this consept directly to
design our new optimization problems. The AN signal will
be constructive to the received signal at the IR if that moves
the receives symbols away from the decision thresholds of the
constellation (e.g. real and imaginary axes for QPSK symbols
in Fig. 2a). Hence we intend to keep the angle of that part
aligned with the angle of the corresponding desired symbol sd
by appropriately designing the transmit beamforming vectors.
We can do so by pushing the decision symbols towards the
constructive regions of the modulation constellation, denoted
by the green shaded areas (cf. Fig. 2a).
For constructive precoding, the AN signals received at the
IR are not suppressed or nullified in contrast to the conven-
tional use of AN [13], [14], rather optimized instantaneously
such that it contributes to the received signal power. If the AN
signals can be aligned with the data symbols sd by properly
designing the beamforming precoding vectors bn,i, ∀i, then all
AN symbols will contribute constructively. Accordingly, it can
be shown that the receive SINR (4) at the IR can be rewritten
as [6], [7]
γd =
∣∣∣hTdbdsd + hTd ∑Ni=1 bn,isn,i∣∣∣2
σ2d
. (10)
Note that the receive SINR at the IR has actually become SNR
after constructive AN precoding. However, the SINR at the kth
(a) Constructive AN design for the legitimate receiver. (b) Destructive AN design for the eavesdropper.
Fig. 2: Exploiting constructive and destructive AN for QPSK symbols.
Eve remains the same as in (5) since no AN signal has been
made constructive to the Eves.
Thus exploiting AN power constructively, the SINR con-
straint (8b) can be reformulated as the following system of
constraints
∠
(
h
T
dbdsd +
N∑
i=1
h
T
d bn,isn,i
)
= ∠ (sd) (11a)
ℜ
{
h
T
d
(
bd +
∑N
i=1 bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)}2
σ2d
≥ Γd, (11b)
where ℜ{x} indicates the real part of the complex number x
and ∠x denotes the corresponding angle. Note that the phases
of the AN signals in (11b) has been shifted by the phase of
the desired symbol sd. The constraint (11a) imposes that the
AN fully aligns with the phase of the symbol of interest sd
at the IR, whereas the constraint (11b) guarantees that the
constructively precoded AN signals can adequately satisfy the
SINR requirement at the IR.
Essentially, the angular constraint (11a) is a very strict
constraint. But exploiting the concept of constructive inter-
ference, we can actually relax this constraint without losing
any optimality which results in a larger feasible region. Let us
denote y˜d , hTd
(
bd +
∑N
i=1 bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)
as the received
signal ignoring the AWGN at the IR, with constructive AN
injected, and αR and αI as the abscissa and the ordinate
of the phase-adjusted signal y˜d, respectively. Applying basic
geometric principles to Fig. 2a, the constraints in (11) can be
equivalently represented as
ℑ
{
h
T
d
(
bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)}
= 0 (12a)
ℜ
{
h
T
d
(
bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)}
≥ σd
√
Γd, (12b)
where ℑ{x} indicates the imaginary part of the complex
number x. However, it can be observed from Fig. 2a that the
AN contaminated received signal y˜d does not necessarily need
to strictly align the angle of the desired signal. That is, y˜d lays
on the constructive zone of the desired symbol sd as long as
the following condition is satisfied
− θ ≤ φd ≤ θ, i.e., |αI|
αR − Γ˜d
≤ tan θ, (13)
where Γ˜d , σd
√
Γd and θ = pi/M , M is the constellation
size. Thus the strict angle constraint (12a) can be relaxed as
∣∣∣∣∣ℑ
{
h
T
d
(
bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)}∣∣∣∣∣
≤
(
ℜ
{
h
T
d
(
bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)}
− σd
√
Γd
)
× tan θ, (14)
Interestingly, the QoS constraint (12b) is embedded in (14).
Hence we do not need to explicitly include it in the construc-
tive interference precoding optimization problem. Thus the
plain constructive interference based secure transmit precoding
optimization problem can be formulated as
P1 : min
bd,{bn,i}
∥∥∥∥∥bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
(15a)
s.t.
∣∣∣∣∣ℑ
{
h
T
d
(
bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)}∣∣∣∣∣
≤
(
ℜ
{
h
T
d
(
bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)}
−σd
√
Γd
)
tan θ, (15b)∣∣∣hTe,kbd∣∣∣2∑N
i=1
∣∣∣hTe,kbn,i∣∣∣2 + σ2e
≤ Γe,k, ∀k. (15c)
Note that problem (15) adopts the instantaneous transmit
power (including data symbols) as the objective to minimize,
as opposed to the average transmit power in conventional
optimization framework (8). Manipulating the constraint (15c),
the problem (15c) can be reformulated as a standard SOCP,
which can be optimally solved using optimization toolboxes,
e.g., CVX [23]. Note that the relaxed angular constraint (15b)
allows a larger feasibility region (entire green zone in Fig. 2a),
which results in a lower minimum transmit power as we will
observe in Section VII.
V. DESTRUCTIVE INTERFERENCE BASED AN PRECODING
In this section, our attempt is to further improve the secrecy
performance utilizing the concept of destructive interference
for the eavesdroppers. The concept is that, we will design the
AN beamformers such that the AN signal is constructive to the
IR while destructive to the Eves. As long as some knowledge
of the Eves’ channels is available at the transmitter, one can do
so by pushing the received signal at the IR towards the decision
thresholds (green zone in Fig. 2a) while pushing the received
signal at the Eves away from the decision thresholds (red zone
in Fig. 2b). This makes correct detection more challenging
for the Eves by reducing the receive SINR. The benefit is
that given secrecy thresholds can be guaranteed with lower
transmit power. More importantly, it will be shown in the
following optimization schemes that the secrecy constraints
are guaranteed on a symbol-by-symbol basis, rather than the
conventional statistical guarantees.
By denoting αR,k and αI,k as the real and imaginary parts
of y˜e,k , hTe,k
(
bd +
∑N
i=1 bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)
, respectively,
y˜e,k, ∀k, will lay in the red zone in Fig. 2b if either of the
following two constraints is satisfied
φe,k ≤ −θ =⇒ −αI,k
αR,k − Γ˜e,k
≤ tan θ, ∀k, if αI,k < 0, (16a)
φe,k ≥ θ =⇒ αI,k
αR,k − Γ˜e,k
≥ tan θ, ∀k, if αI,k > 0, (16b)
That is, the SINR restriction constraints at the Eves can be
represented by the following system of inequalities
−ℑ
{
h
T
e,k
(
bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)}
≤
(
ℜ
{
h
T
e,k
(
bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)}
− σe
√
Γe,k
)
× tan θ, ∀k. (17a)
ℑ
{
h
T
e,k
(
bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)}
≥
(
ℜ
{
h
T
e,k
(
bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)}
− σe
√
Γe,k
)
× tan θ, ∀k. (17b)
where Γ˜e,k , σe
√
Γe,k. Thus exploiting the knowledge of
the interfering signals (AN in this case), the constructive AN-
based precoding design problem with secrecy power minimiza-
tion objective can be formulated as
P2 : min
bd,{bn,i}
∥∥∥∥∥bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
(18a)
s.t.
∣∣∣∣∣ℑ
{
h
T
d
(
bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)}∣∣∣∣∣
≤
(
ℜ
{
h
T
d
(
bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)}
−σd
√
Γd
)
tan θ, (18b)
(17a) and (17b) satisfied. (18c)
Problem (18) is a standard second-order cone program, thus
can be efficiently solved using interior-point based solvers
[23]. Note that by the inclusion of the data vectors, the
secrecy constraints are guaranteed on a symbol-by-symbol
basis, as opposed to the conventional statistical secrecy [12]–
[15]. Moreover, the virtual multicasting concept introduced
in [7] for a MISO broadcast system is not applicable to the
secrecy beamforming problem (15) or (18).
VI. ROBUST CONSTRUCTIVE-DESTRUCTIVE
INTERFERENCE PRECODING
In the previous sections, it was assumed that perfect CSI
of all the nodes is available at the transmitter. However,
that is a very strict assumption for many practical wireless
communication systems. In particular, obtaining the perfect
Eves’ CSI is always a challenging task. Hence in this section,
we study robust AN precoding design for scenarios when the
available CSI is imperfect.
We model the imperfect CSI considering the widely used
Gaussian channel error model such that the channel error
vectors have circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG)
distribution. Thus, the actual channels between the BS and the
IR can be modeled as
hd = hˆd + ed, (19)
and that between the BS and the kth Eve can be modelled as
he,k = hˆe,k + ee,k, ∀k, (20)
where hˆd and hˆe,k, ∀k, denote the imperfect estimated CSI
available at the BS and ed, ee,k ∈ CNT×1, ∀k, represent the
channel uncertainties such that ‖ed‖2 ≤ ε2d, and ‖ee,k‖2 ≤
ε2e , ∀k, respectively.
A. Conventional AN-Aided Robust Secure Precoding
Conventional AN-aided downlink robust secrecy power
minimization problem with SINR constraints is formulated as
min
bd,{bn,i}
‖bd‖2 +
N∑
i=1
‖bn,i‖2 (21a)
s.t. min
‖ed‖≤εd
∣∣hTdbd∣∣2∑N
i=1
∣∣hTdbn,i∣∣2 + σ2d ≥ Γd, (21b)
max
‖ee,k‖≤εe
∣∣∣hTe,kbd∣∣∣2∑N
i=1
∣∣∣hTe,kbn,i∣∣∣2 + σ2e
≤ Γe,k.(21c)
Due to the spherical channel uncertainty model, constraints
(21b) and (21c) actually involve infinitely many constraints
which makes the problem (21) very difficult to solve. However,
applying S-procedure [14, Lemma 2], the inequality con-
straints in (21) can be transformed into convex linear matrix
inequality constraints and thus problem (21) can be readily
solved using existing solvers. It has been proved in [15] that
whenever problem (21) is feasible, the corresponding transmit
precoding solution is of rank-one hence optimal.
B. Constructive AN-Aided Robust Secure Precoding
In this section, we aim at robust precoding design such that
the AN is constructive to the IR while destructive to the Eves
with imperfect knowledge of all CSI. With the determinis-
tic channel uncertainty model described above, we consider
worst-case based robust design. Thus the constructive AN
based robust power minimization problem can be formulated
as given in equation (22).
Note that the information and the AN beamforming vectors
appear in identical form in the objective functions as well
as in the constraints in problem (22). Denoting b , bd +∑N
i=1 bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
, the problem can thus be represented as
min
bd,{bn,i}
‖b‖2 (23a)
s.t.
∣∣∣∣ℑ
{(
hˆd + ed
)T
b
}∣∣∣∣ ≤
(
ℜ
{(
hˆd + ed
)T
b
}
−σd
√
Γd
)
tan θ, ∀‖ed‖ ≤ εd, (23b)
−ℑ
{(
hˆe,k + ee,k
)T
b
}
≤
(
ℜ
{(
hˆe,k + ee,k
)T
×b} − σe
√
Γe,k
)
tan θ, ∀‖ee,k‖ ≤ εe, ∀k, (23c)
ℑ
{(
hˆe,k + ee,k
)T
b
}
≥
(
ℜ
{(
hˆe,k + ee,k
)T
b
}
−σe
√
Γe,k
)
tan θ, ∀‖ee,k‖ ≤ εe, ∀k. (23d)
Considering the real and imaginary parts of each complex
vector separately, we have
hd = hˆR,d + jhˆI,d + eR,d + jeI,d, (24)
b = bR + jbI , (25)
where the subscripts R and I indicate the real and imaginary
components of the corresponding complex notation, respec-
tively. As such, we have,
ℜ
{(
hˆd + ed
)T
b
}
= hˆTR,dbR − hˆTI,dbI + eTR,dbR − eTI,dbI
= h˜Tdb1 + e˜
T
db1, (26)
where h˜d ,
[
hˆ
T
R,d hˆ
T
I,d
]T
, e˜d ,
[
e
T
R,d e
T
I,d
]T
, and b1 ,[
b
T
R − bTI
]T
. Similarly,
ℑ
{(
hˆd + ed
)T
b
}
= hˆTR,dbR + hˆ
T
I,dbI + e
T
R,dbR + e
T
I,dbI
= h˜Tdb2 + e˜
T
db2, (27)
with b2 ,
[
b
T
R b
T
I
]T
. Thus the constraint (23b) can be
explicitly expressed as the following two constraints
max
‖ed‖≤εd
h˜
T
db2 + e˜
T
db2 −
(
h˜
T
d b1 + e˜
T
d b1
)
tan θ
+σd
√
Γd ≤ 0 (28)
max
‖ed‖≤εd
−h˜Tdb2 − e˜Tdb2 −
(
h˜
T
d b1 + e˜
T
d b1
)
tan θ
+σd
√
Γd ≤ 0. (29)
Similarly, the constraints (23c) and (23d) can be, respectively,
rewritten as
max
‖ee,k‖≤εe
−h˜Te,kb2 − e˜Te,kb2−
(
h˜
T
e,kb1 + e˜
T
e,kb1
)
tan θ
+ σe
√
Γe,k ≤ 0 (30)
min
‖ee,k‖≤εe
h˜
T
e,kb2 + e˜
T
e,kb2−
(
h˜
T
e,kb1 + e˜
T
e,kb1
)
tan θ
+ σe
√
Γe,k ≥ 0. (31)
min
bd,{bn,i}
∥∥∥∥∥bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
(22a)
s.t.
∣∣∣∣∣ℑ
{
h
T
d
(
bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)}∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
(
ℜ
{
h
T
d
(
bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)}
− σd
√
Γd
)
tan θ,
∀‖ed‖ ≤ εd, (22b)
−ℑ
{
h
T
e,k
(
bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)}
≤
(
ℜ
{
h
T
e,k
(
bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)}
− σe
√
Γe,k
)
tan θ,
∀‖ee,k‖ ≤ εe, ∀k, (22c)
ℑ
{
h
T
e,k
(
bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)}
≥
(
ℜ
{
h
T
e,k
(
bd +
N∑
i=1
bn,ie
j(φn,i−φd)
)}
− σe
√
Γe,k
)
tan θ,
∀‖ee,k‖ ≤ εe, ∀k. (22d)
By replacing the CSI error bounds in these constraints, the
robust problem (23) can be reformulated as
min
b1,b2
‖b2‖2 s.t. (32a)
h˜
T
d b2 − h˜Td b1 tan θ + εd ‖b2 − b1 tan θ‖
+ σd
√
Γd ≤ 0 (32b)
− h˜Tdb2 − h˜Tdb1 tan θ + εd ‖b2 + b1 tan θ‖
+ σd
√
Γd ≤ 0, (32c)
− h˜Te,kb2 − h˜Te,kb1 tan θ − εe ‖b2 + b1‖ tan θ
+ σe
√
Γe,k ≤ 0 (32d)
h˜
T
e,kb2 + h˜
T
e,kb1 tan θ − εe ‖b2 + b1‖ tan θ
+ σe
√
Γe,k ≥ 0. (32e)
The SOCP problem (32) can be efficiently solved using
existing solvers [23].
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section presents numerical simulation results to eval-
uate the performance of the proposed constructive interfer-
ence based PLS algorithms in a MISO wiretap channel.
For comparison, conventional secure precoding performances
have also been included. For simplicity, it was assumed that
Γe,k = Γe, ∀k and σ2d = σ2e = 1. Unless otherwise specified,
N = 3 and QPSK is the modulation scheme considered. All
the estimated channel vectors are generated as independent
and identically distributed complex Gaussian random variables
with mean zero and the TGn path-loss model for urban cellular
environment is adopted considering a path-loss exponent of
2.7 [24]. All simulation results are averaged over 1000 inde-
pendent channel realizations, unless explicitly mentioned. In
the following simulations, we compare the performance of the
proposed approaches with that of the conventional AN-aided
precoding scheme in [22] as the benchmark. Specifically, we
denote the conventional precoding schemes as ‘Conv Prec’, the
constructive interference based precoding scheme developed
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Fig. 3: Transmit power PT versus required SINR at IR Γd
with NT = 8,K = 4, 6, and Γe = 5 (dB).
in Section IV as ‘Const Prec’, and the destructive interference
based scheme in Section V as ‘Const-Dest Prec’ in the figures
below.
We start the performance analysis of the proposed construc-
tive interference based secure AN precoding schemes assum-
ing perfect CSI of all the nodes available at the transmitter.
Fig. 3 shows the average transmit power versus the SINR
requirement at the IR required for the proposed constructive-
only (in problem (15)) as well as the constructive-destructive
AN precoding optimization scheme (in problem (18)) as
compared with the conventional AN precoding scheme (in
problem (9)) for K = 4 and 6. Other parameters are set as
NT = 8 and Γe = 5 (dB). It can be observed that the proposed
constructive interference algorithms achieve significant power
gains compared to the conventional AN precoding scheme.
Also, if there exist more eavesdroppers, additional power is
needed in all optimization schemes to block the interception.
In the next example, we examine the transmit power require-
ment against the maximum allowable eavesdropping SINR Γe.
Fig. 4 plots the average transmit power PT versus Γe for
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Fig. 4: Transmit power PT versus required SINR Γe with
NT = 6,K = 4, and Γd = 20 (dB).
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Fig. 5: SER versus SINR threshold Γd with NT = 6,K = 2, 5,
and Γe = 5 (dB).
NT = 6, K = 4 and different values of Γd. The results in
Fig. 4 are consistent with those in Fig. 3 in the sense that
increased SINR threshold at the IR requires higher transmit
power. However, with the increase in the allowable SINR
threshold at the Eves, the required transmit power gradually
decreases due to the relaxed eavesdropping constraints. Also,
in any case, the constructive interference based precoding
schemes outperform the conventional AN-aided secure pre-
coding schemes.
Next, we analyze SER performance of the proposed scheme
as opposed to the conventional precoding schemes. The results
in Fig. 5 indicate that the SER in all the schemes decreases
in line with the SINR threshold at the IR. Notably, at a SER
of 10−3, the constructive interference based secure precoding
scheme achieves almost 2.4 dB gain compared to the conven-
tional approach. Also, it is no surprise that a larger number
of Eves (K) has a negative impact on the SER since we need
to employ more resources to block a larger set of Eves and
there will be more non-active constraints for the eavesdropping
SINR.
Finally, we analyze the performance of the proposed robust
beamforming design with NT = 6,K = 3, Γe = 5 (dB),
and εd = 0.1, εe = 0.3, when imperfect CSI is available at
the BS. In Fig. 6, the robust schemes indicate the solution to
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Fig. 6: Transmit power PT versus required SINR Γd with
NT = 6,K = 3, Γe = 5 (dB), and εd = 0.1, εe = 0.3.
the problems (21) and (32), respectively, for conventional and
constructive AN based precoding schemes. On the other hand,
the ‘Non-robust’ scheme is designed treating the imperfect
channel estimates available at the BS as the perfect CSI,
hence yields noticeable performance degradation. However,
the proposed constructive interference based robust secure
beamforming schemes demonstrate significant transmit power
gain.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed the novel idea of designing the AN-aided
secure precoding schemes as constructive to the IR and de-
structive to the Eves at the same time. This introduces a major
breakthrough in the conventional approach of transmitting AN
for improving PLS. The concept opens up new opportuni-
ties for expanding the secrecy rate regions. We studied the
downlink transmit power minimization problem considering
both perfect and imperfect CSI at the BS. Simulation results
demonstrated that significant performance gain is achievable
by the proposed constructive AN precoding schemes compared
to the conventional schemes and have established the proposed
approach as a new dimension in the design of PLS.
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